Category Archives: DDoS Criminals

Chinese Firm Defends Webcam Security After DDoS Attacks

Hangzhou Xiongmai Technology says devices sold in the US before April 2015 will be recalled after attack on Dyn servers. China’s Hangzhou Xiongmai Technology, which has issued a recall for thousands of webcams sold in the US that were used in a massive distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on the servers of US-based internet company Dyn, said the hacks occurred because customers didn’t change the default password, according to the AP. The attack, which in part came through devices with Xiongmai components, briefly cut access to many sites including Twitter, Netflix, Amazon, and Spotify. Xiongmai’s Liu Yuexin told AP the company did its best to secure the devices. The company, he added, came to know of the weakness in its webcams and digital recorders in April 2015 and had patched the flaws. Vulnerabilities in devices by Xiongmai and video surveillance maker Dahua first came to light after an attack on the website of cybersecurity writer Brian Krebs and has highlighted concerns of security risks from interconnected consumer gadgets. Source: http://www.darkreading.com/attacks-breaches/chinese-firm-defends-webcam-security-after-ddos-attacks/d/d-id/1327298

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Chinese Firm Defends Webcam Security After DDoS Attacks

Anonymous hacker charged with #opJustina DDoS attacks on hospital

The Anonymous-affiliated hacker who admitted to cyberattacks on two hospitals in the #opJustinaoperation and fled the country while being investigated was indicted last week. Martin Gottesfeld, 32, a biotechnology information technology professional from Somerville, Massachusetts, is being charged with conspiracy to launch cyberattacks against two local hospitals: Boston Children’s Hospital (BCH) and the Wayside Youth and Family Support Network, a mental health facility. Those two hospitals were at the center of a case that attracted masses of media attention: that of Justina Pelletier, the then-15-year-old who was caught in a 16-month custody battle as her parents tried to have her treated for mitochondrial disease at one hospital, while Boston Children’s Hospital treated her in a psychiatric unit as a ward of the state. Gottesfeld’s indictment, handed down on Wednesday, also charges him with intentional damage to a protected computer. Both are felony hacking charges. Gottesfeld admitted to the attacks last month, explaining how he did it and why in an editorial published by the Huffington Post. I had heard many, too many, such horror stories of institutionalized children who were killed or took their own lives in the so-called “troubled teen industry”. I never imagined a renowned hospital would be capable of such brutality and no amount of other good work could justify torturing Justina. The distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against BCH was planned for maximum financial damage, Gottesfeld said: he knew that the hospital was planning a big fundraising drive and that most donors gave online. In his editorial, he went on to scoff at BCH for making it easy for him to attack it, since the hospital kept its donation page on the same public network as the rest of its systems: Rookie mistake. To take it down, I’d have to knock the whole hospital off the internet. He also claimed that no patients would be harmed: There’s no such thing as an outage-proof network, so hospitals have to be able to function without the internet. It’s required by federal law, and for accreditation. The only effects would be financial and on BCH’s reputation. That’s not how the hospital, or the prosecution, sees it. The indictment states that BCH had to shut down its access to the internet and email servers to protect patient medical records. That meant that physicians outside the hospital couldn’t get at patients’ records. Nor could patients communicate with their doctors. BCH claims that responding to, and mitigating, the damage of the attack cost $300,000, while the disruption in fundraising meant another $300,000 hit, for a total loss of $600,000. Gottesfeld claims that the attack against BCH was a justifiable reaction to the actions of the hospital, which was described as  a “parentectomy”. Gottesfeld’s defence, to blame the hospital for the attack, is all too commonly heard. The blame-the-victim reasoning is often voiced by other cyberattackers, be it from people who guess at weak passwords and use them to waltz into accounts without authorization, or those who launch crippling attacks such as those that Gottesfeld admits to. But just because it’s easy to do doesn’t make those or other cybercrimes OK. They’re illegal, and they can result in jail time, fines or both. Each of the charges Gottesfeld’s facing carry a maximum sentence of five years in jail, along with fines. Gottesfeld has been detained in Rhode Island since he and his wife were plucked off their boat near the coast of Cuba and arrested in Florida. When the indictment was handed down last Wednesday, Gottesfeld was reportedly on day 16 of a hunger strike over the appointment of the office of Carmen Ortiz as his prosecutor. Ortiz was the prosecutor in the cases against both Aaron Swartz and Jonathan James, who both later took their own lives. She has faced sharp criticism over her approach to those cases. In spite of his admission to the DDoS attacks, Gottesfeld is likely to plead not guilty at his arraignment this week before US Magistrate Judge Marianne B. Bowler, his wife told the Washington Times. Source: https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/10/24/anonymous-hacker-charged-with-opjustina-ddos-attacks-on-hospitals/

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Anonymous hacker charged with #opJustina DDoS attacks on hospital

How Hackers Make Money from DDoS Attacks

Attacks like Friday’s are often financially motivated. Yesterday’s attack on the internet domain directory Dyn, which took major sites like Twitter and Paypal offline, was historic in scale. But the motivation for the attack may seem opaque, since no valuable information seems to have been stolen. A group called New World Hackers is claiming credit, but giving conflicting accounts of their motives—and security experts have called them “impostors.” So why else might someone have done it? This class of hack, known as a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, has been around for a while. And while many DDoS attacks are indeed motivated by politics, revenge, or petty trolling, there’s frequently money involved. For instance, DDoS attacks are often used as leverage for blackmail. Once a hacking group has a reputation for being able to field a large and dangerous botnet to knock servers offline, they can demand huge ‘protection’ payments from businesses afraid of facing their wrath. In fact, they don’t even have to do the hacking in the first place—in one recent case, someone posing as a notorious cabal merely emailed blackmail messages and managed to pocket tens of thousands of dollars before they were exposed. In the current case, there are rumors that Dyn was a target of extortion attempts before the attack. And the hackers behind what may be the biggest DDoS attack in history could demand a pretty penny to leave other companies alone. A wave of impostors will likely give it a shot, too. There’s another, even darker money-driven application of DDoS attacks—industrial sabotage. Companies seeking to undermine their competition can hire hackers to take the other guys offline. DDoS services are often contracted through so-called “booter” portals where anyone can hire a hacker’s botnet in increments as small as 15 minutes. Researchers found last year that three of the most prominent booter services at the time had over 6,000 subscribers in total, and had launched over 600,000 attacks. (And despite the criminal reputation of Bitcoin, by far the largest method used to pay for DDoS-for-hire was Paypal.) But it’s unlikely that this was some sort of hit called in by a competitor of Dyn—that tactic seems to primarily appeal to already-shady dealers, including online gambling operations. Finally, DDoS attacks can serve as a kind of smokescreen for more directly lucrative crimes. While a security team is struggling to deal with an army of zombie DVRs pummeling their system, attackers can grab passwords, credit card numbers, or identity information. In weighing possible explanations for Friday’s attack, it’s important to note the massive scale of the thing. Even if their claims of responsibility aren’t credible, New World Hackers’ description of about 1.2 terabits of data per second thrown at Dyn’s servers is both vaguely plausible and utterly mind-boggling. That’s around a thousand times as powerful as the huge 620 gigabit per second attack that knocked out a single website, Krebs on Security, last month. Dyn has also described the attack as sophisticated, arriving in three separate waves that targeted different parts of their systems. That kind of operation could have been pulled off by a gang of kids doing it for kicks—and maybe that’s the scarier scenario. But such a massive undertaking suggests bigger, and possibly more lucrative, motivations. Source: http://fortune.com/2016/10/22/ddos-attack-hacker-profit/

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How Hackers Make Money from DDoS Attacks

Twitter, Amazon, other top websites shut in cyber attack

Major internet services including Twitter, Spotify and Amazon suffered service interruptions and outages on Friday as a US internet provider came under a cyber attack. The internet service company Dyn, which routes and manages internet traffic, said that it had suffered a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack on its domain name service shortly after 1100 GMT. The service was restored in about two hours, Dyn said. The attack meant that millions of internet users could not access the websites of major online companies such as Netflix and Reddit as well as the crafts marketplace Etsy and the software developer site Github, according to media reports. The website Gizmodo said it had received reports of difficulty at sites for media outlets including CNN, The Guardian, Wired, HBO and People as well as the money transfer service PayPal. Dyn, which is headquartered in New Hampshire, said the attack went after its domain name service, causing interruptions and slowdowns for internet users. “This morning, October 21, Dyn received a global DDoS attack on our Managed DNS infrastructure in the east coast of the United States,” Scott Hilton, executive vice president for products at Dyn, said in a statement. “We have been aggressively mitigating the DDoS attack against our infrastructure.” The company said it was continuing to investigate. A map published by the website downdetector.com showed service interruptions for Level3 Communications, a so-called “backbone” internet service provider, across much of the US east coast and in Texas. Amazon Web Services, which hosts some of the most popular sites on the internet, including Netflix and the homestay network Airbnb, said on its website that users experienced errors including “hostname unknown” when attempting to access hosted sites but that the problem had been resolved by 1310 GMT. Domain name servers are a crucial element of internet infrastructure, converting numbered Internet Protocol addresses into the domain names that allow users to connect to internet sites. Distributed denial of service or DDoS attacks involve flooding websites with traffic, making them difficult to access or taking them offline entirely. Attackers can use them for a range of purposes, including censorship, protest and extortion. The loose-knit hacktivist network Anonymous in 2010 targeted the DNS provider EveryDNS among others in 2010 as retribution for denying service to the anti-secrecy organization WikiLeaks. “The internet continues to rely on protocols and infrastructure designed before cyber security was an issue,” said Ben Johnson, a former engineer at the National Security Agency and founder of the cybersecurity company Carbon Black. He said that growing interconnection of ordinary devices to the internet, the so-called “internet of things,” increased the risks to networks. “DDoS, especially with the rise of insecure IOT devices, will continue to plague our organizations. Sadly, what we are seeing is only the beginning in terms of large scale botnets and disproportionate damage done.” Source: http://phys.org/news/2016-10-twitter-spotify-websites-ddos.html

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Twitter, Amazon, other top websites shut in cyber attack

Bitter feud between partners as IBM deflects eCensus blame

NextGen, Vocus refute claims of error. A bitter feud has broken out between IBM and its internet service provider partners for the 2016 eCensus as the main contractor tried to deflect blame for the site’s meltdown on August 9 In its first detailed response to the failure, IBM said it had plans in place for the risk of DDoS attacks, but its efforts were to no avail thanks to a failure at an upstream provider. The ABS at the time said it had been forced to take the site offline on Census night following a series of DDoS attacks combined with the failure of the network geoblocking function and the collapse of a router. The statistics body has publicly criticised IBM for failing to properly implement a geoblocking service, which would have halted the international DDoS attack targeted at the Census site. But IBM is now laying blame squarely at the feet of its internet service provider partner NextGen and NextGen’s upstream supplier Vocus for the geoblocking bungle. It claimed NextGen had provided “repeated” assurances – including after the day’s third DDoS attack – that a geoblocking strategy that IBM codenamed ‘Island Australia’ had been correctly put in place. However, when the fourth and biggest DDoS attack of the day hit at around 7:30pm, IBM said it became clear that a Singapore link operated by Vocus had not been closed off, allowing the attack traffic to pass through to the Census site. “Vocus admitted the error in a teleconference with IBM, NextGen and Telstra around 11.00 pm on 9 August 2016,” IBM said. “Had NextGen (and through it Vocus) properly implemented Island Australia, it would have been effective to prevent this DDoS attack and the effects it had on the eCensus site. As a result, the eCensus site would not have become unavailable to the public during the peak period on 9 August 2016.” IBM said while it accepted its responsibility as the head contractor for the eCensus, it could not have avoided using ISPs to provide links for the website. “It is not possible for an IT services company such as IBM to implement the 2016 eCensus without engaging ISPs. It was necessary for IBM to involve the ISPs in the implementation of the geoblocking solution as they have control over their respective data networks and are in a position to block internet traffic originating from particular domains or IP addresses.” IBM did, however, admit what many security experts speculated had occured – that following the fourth DDoS a system monitoring dashboard showed an apparent spike in outbound traffic, causing its staff to wrongly assume data was being exfiltrated from the website, prompting IBM to shut down the website. The contractor also revealed that a configuration error meant a manual reboot of one of its routers – which was needed after the eCensus firewall became overloaded with traffic – took much longer to rectify than it should have, keeping the site offline for a further hour and a half. NextGen, Vocus fight back But Vocus said NextGen was well aware that Vocus would not provide geoblocking services, and had instead recommended its own DDoS protection. IBM declined the offer, Vocus said. NextGen and Vocus instead agreed on remote triggered black hole (RTBH) route advertisements with international carriers. “If Vocus DDoS protection product was left in place the eCensus website would have been appropriately shielded from DDoS attacks,” Vocus said in its submission to the inquiry. Vocus refuted IBM’s claim that it had failed to implement geoblocking, revealing that it had not been made aware of IBM’s DDoS mitigation strategy – including ‘Island Australia’ – until after the fourth attack on August 9. “As a result, any assumption that Vocus was required to, or had implemented Island Australia or geo-blocking including, without limitation … are inaccurate,” Vocus said. “Once Vocus was made aware of the fourth DDoS attack, it implemented a static null route to block additional DDoS traffic at its international border routers within 15 minutes.” Vocus also argued that the fourth DDoS was not as large as IBM claimed, comprising of attack traffic that peaked at 563Mbps and lasting only 14 minutes – which it said was “not considered significant in the industry”. “Such attacks would not usually bring down the Census website which should have had relevant preparations in place to enable it to cater for the expected traffic from users as well as high likelihood of DDoS attacks.” NextGen, in its own submission, claimed it had “strongly recommended” to IBM that it take up a DDoS protection product like that on offer by Vocus, but the contractor declined. The ISP said it was not made aware of details of IBM’s ‘Island Australia’ strategy until six days before the eCensus went live in late July. At that point it told IBM that an IP address range it had provided was part of a larger aggregate network and therefore would not respond to “specific international routing restrictions” if ‘Island Australia’ was implemented. “Nextgen recommended using an alternative IP address range, which would give IBM better control, but this was rejected by IBM,” the ISP said. IBM instead chose to request NextGen’s upstream suppliers apply IP address blocking filters and international remote black holes for 20 host routes. “Nextgen believes that the individual host routes picked by IBM may not be exhaustive, and DDoS attacks could come from other routes in the IP address range (which they did in the third DDoS attack on Census day),” NextGen said. “There were a number of routes without geoblocking during the fourth DDoS attack, and which were not identified during testing, along with the [Vocus] Singapore link.” NextGen said it again offered to implement DDoS protection, this time at its own cost, which IBM agreed to four days after the events of August 9. Source: http://www.itnews.com.au/news/bitter-feud-between-partners-as-ibm-deflects-ecensus-blame-439752

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Bitter feud between partners as IBM deflects eCensus blame

Leaked Mirai source code already being tested in wild, analysis suggests

Since the source code to the Mirai Internet of Things botnet was publicly leaked on Sept. 30, researchers at Imperva have uncovered evidence of several low-level distributed denial of serviceattacks likely perpetrated by new users testing out this suddenly accessible DDoS tool. With its unusual ability to bombard targets with traffic in the form of generic routing encapsulation (GRE) data packets, Mirai was leveraged last month to launch a massive DDoS attack against Internet security researcher Brian Krebs’ blog site KrebsonSecurity. Soon after, a Hackforums user with the nickname Anna-senpai publicly posted the botnet’s source code – quite possibly a move by the malware’s original author to impede investigators from closing in on him. In a blog post this week, Imperva reported several low-level DDoS attacks taking place in the days following the leak. Consisting of low-volume application layer HTTP floods leveraging small numbers of source IPs, these attacks “looked like the experimental first steps of new Mirai users who were testing the water after the malware became widely available,” the blog post read. But Imperva also found evidence of much stronger Mirai attacks on its network prior to the leak. On Aug. 17, Imperva mitigated numerous GRE traffic surges that peaked at 280 Gbps and 130 million packets per second. Traffic from this attack originated from nearly 50,000 unique IPs in 164 countries, many of which were linked to Internet-enabled CCTV cameras, DVRs and routers – all infected by Mirai, which continuously scans the web for vulnerable devices that use default or hard-coded usernames and passwords. An Imperva analysis of the source code revealed several unique traits, including a hardcoded blacklist of IPs that the adversary did not want to attack, perhaps in order to keep a low profile. Some of these IPs belonged to the Department of Defense, the U.S. Postal Service and General Electric. Ben Herzberg, security group research manager with Imperva Incapsula, told SCMagazine.com in a phone interview that the Marai’s author may have truncated the complete blacklist before publishing it – possibly because such information could offer a clue as to the attacker’s identity. Imperva also found Mirai to be territorial in nature, using killer scripts to eliminate other worms, trojans and botnet programs that may have infiltrated the same IoT devices. Moreover, the company noted traces of Russian-language strings, which could offer a clue to the malware’s origin. Herzberg said it’s only a matter of time before Mirai’s newest users make their own modifications. “People will start playing with the code and say, ‘Hey, let’s modify this, change this,” said Herzberg. “They have a nice base to start with.” Web performance and security company Cloudflare also strongly suspects it has encountered multiple Mirai DDoS attacks, including one HTTP-based attack that peaked at 1.75 million requests per second. According to a company blog post, the assault leveraged a botnet composed of over 52,000 unique IP addresses, which bombarded the Cloudflare network – primarily its Hong Kong and Prague data centers – with a flurry of short HTTP requests designed to use up server resources and take down web applications. A second HTTP-based attack launched from close to 129,000 unique IP addresses generated fewer requests per second, but consumed up to 360Gbps of inbound HTTP traffic – an unusually high number for this brand of attack. In this instance, much of the malicious traffic was concentrated in Frankfurt. Cloudflare concluded that the attacks were launched from compromised IoT devices, including a high concentration of connected CCTV cameras running on Vietnamese networks and multiple unidentified devices operating in Ukraine. “Although the most recent attacks have mostly involved Internet-connected cameras, there’s no reason to think that they are likely the only source of future DDoS attacks,” the Imperva report warns. “As more and more devices (fridges, fitness trackers, sleep monitors…) are added to the Internet they’ll likely be unwilling participants in future attacks.” Of course, compromised IoT devices can be used for more than just DDoS attacks. Today, Akamai Technologies released a white paper warning of a new in-the-wild exploit called SSHowDowN that capitalizes on a 12-year-old IoT vulnerability. According to Akamai, cybercriminals are remotely converting millions of IoT devices into proxies that route malicious traffic to targeted websites in order to check stolen log-in credentials against them and determine where they can be used. Bad actors can also use the same exploit to check websites for SQL injection vulnerabilities, and can even launch attacks against the internal network hosting the Internet-connected device. The vulnerability, officially designated as CVE-2004-1653, affects poorly configured devices that use default passwords, including video surveillance equipment, satellite antenna equipment, networking devices and Network Attached Storage devices. It allows a remote user to create an authorized Socket Shell (SSH) tunnel and use it as a SOCKS proxy, even if the device is supposedly hardened against SSH connections. “What we’re trying to do is raise awareness,” especially among IoT vendors said Ryan Barnett, principal security research at Akamai, in an interview with SCMagazine.com. Barnett noted that when the CVE first came out, an exploit on it was “more theoretical,” but now “we want to show it is actively being used in a massive attack campaign.” Source: http://www.scmagazine.com/leaked-mirai-source-code-already-being-tested-in-wild-analysis-suggests/article/547313/

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Leaked Mirai source code already being tested in wild, analysis suggests

A Decade of DDoS Education: What’s Changed and What’s Stayed the Same

While Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have been around for over 20 years, they have only become well-known to the majority of enterprises over the past ten years or so. Ten years ago, many enterprise IT teams only had a vague idea of what a DDoS attack was because they noticed the common symptoms “our website is down,” “the firewall crashed,” “nothing works” etc. The average IT team in 2006 would not have been aware of the techniques DDoS attacks typically used like spoofed addresses or POST floods. In order to provide a true understanding of what DDoS attacks were and how enterprises could defend against them, some basic education had to happen. In 2006 that meant putting it in terms that everyone understood, “what would happen to our meeting if we tried fitting 100 people in this room?” Eventually as education continued and attacks grew in notoriety, the basics of DDoS became common knowledge in the industry. But DDoS in its nature is an evolving threat and as application-layer attacks became predominant more education was needed. Application-layer attacks are not about blocking access to the door of the meeting room anymore, now we had to explain the stealthy nature of low-volume, targeted attacks. “So you’ve let two of us in this meeting room because we appear to be legitimate salespeople, but now we’re going to unplug the projector so you can’t run your meeting properly.” Now ten years later, the majority of enterprise IT teams have a solid understanding of the threat DDoS poses and the basics of defense but even today we still come across people who believe they can protect themselves against DDoS attacks by simply increasing their bandwidth or relying on their firewalls or unified threat management appliances. With the volume of attacks today that is definitely not enough to ensure service and network availability in the face of sustained DDoS attacks. The majority of DDoS education today has shifted from learning about the attack methods themselves to the correct defense techniques and processes. Even with the significant improvements in DDoS education and awareness, a lot of people still have unrealistic expectations that once they install a DDoS mitigation solution their job is done. There is no silver bullet against DDoS attacks. There is no magic box, there is no “set it and forget it” solution. You still have to educate the user. Part of this comes from the misconception that DDoS attacks are launched by untalented kids. While that is true in some cases, many enterprise IT teams are surprised to find themselves often fighting against talented opponents who are often smarter than them, have more time than them and whose effort to start attacks is minuscule compared to their effort in blocking them. Often times, when faced with these advanced adversaries, IT teams are quickly overwhelmed. Even though they have some mitigation tools in place, they may not have the  right  tools. They may not know who to call or recognize the type of attack targeting their systems. In short, they don’t have a technology problem, they have a people and process problem. Think of DDoS defense like a NASCAR race, you have a super-powerful car (your DDoS mitigation solution or service), but if you don’t know how to drive over 70 mph, you’re going to crash and hurt yourself very quickly. And let’s not even mention what happens if you decided to install that cheap transmission because it was half-off. Enterprise IT teams need to focus on building the best car they can, hiring a skilled team that can keep the car in its best possible condition and then hiring the best driver they can afford to drive the car when the time comes. Even if you have the best car in the world, an unskilled maintenance team or driver will lead to a third or fourth place finish at the end of the season. But if you want to win the championship, you need the best car, mechanics and driver you can afford. Moving on from the NASCAR analogy, this means: Understanding the technology that best fits your needs: on-premise, always-on, protection or an on-demand service? Customizing that technology to fit your assets. Is it just your website or the services you provide from it? What about defending your corporate network? Identifying and training a team that is capable of understanding all of the procedures in all possible scenarios that surround a DDoS attack. Continue evolving your mitigation strategy. Keep your technology state-of-the-art and provide continuous training for your team. If you follow these steps you’ll end up in the winner’s circle after mitigating another DDoS attack and not in pit row trying to figure out what went wrong. Source: http://wwpi.com/2016/10/12/a-decade-of-ddos-education-whats-changed-and-whats-stayed-the-same/

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A Decade of DDoS Education: What’s Changed and What’s Stayed the Same

130,000 Avtech IP cameras, DVRs can be easily roped into IoT botnets

Security researcher Gergely Eberhardt has unearthed over dozen of vulnerabilities in most IP cameras, NVRs and DVRs by Taiwanese manufacturer Avtech, including things like plaintext storage of administrative password and authentication bypass flaws. Eberhardt, who works for Hungarian security testing outfit Search Lab, says a final tally would likely be even higher, as these vulnerabilities were found within a short period of time and the research was done without a systematic approach. According to the … More ?

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130,000 Avtech IP cameras, DVRs can be easily roped into IoT botnets

How the ‘Internet of unpatchable things’ leads to DDoS attacks

For at least the past year there have been repeated warning to makers of Internet-connected devices about the insecurity of their platforms. Another came today in a report from Akamai Technologies’ threat research team, which has delved into a recent burst of distributed attacks leveraging IoT devices. In this case they are SSHowDowN Proxy attacks using a 12-year old vulnerability in OpenSSH. “We’re entering a very interesting time when it comes to DDoS and other web attacks — ‘The Internet of Unpatchable Things’ so to speak,” Eric Kobrin, Akamai’s director of information security, said in a statement. “New devices are being shipped from the factory not only with this vulnerability exposed, but also without any effective way to fix it. We’ve been hearing for years that it was theoretically possible for IoT devices to attack. That, unfortunately, has now become the reality.” Akamai emphasizes this isn’t a new vulnerability or attack technique. But it does show a continued weakness in many default configurations of Internet-connected devices. These particular attacks have leveraged video surveillance cameras and digital recorders, satellite antenna equipment, networking devices (including routers, switches, Wi-Fi hotspots and modems) and Internet-connected network attached storage. They are being used to mount attacks on any Internet targets as well as internal networks that host connected devices. Unauthorized SSH tunnels were created and used, despite the fact that the IoT devices were supposedly hardened and do not allow the default web interface user to SSH into the device and execute commands, Akamai said. Then attackers used to conduct a mass-scale HTTP-based credential stuffing campaigns against Akamai customers. It offers this mitigation advice to infosec pros: –if possible configure the SSH passwords or keys on devices and change those to passwords or keys that are different from the vendor defaults; –configure the device’s SSH service on your device and either add “AllowTcpForwarding No” and “no-port-forwarding” and “no-X11-forwarding” to the ~/ssh/authorized_ keys file for all users, or disable SSH entirely via the device’s administration console; –if the device is behind a firewall, consider disabling inbound connections from outside the network to port 22 of any deployed IoT devices, or disabling outbound connections from IoT devices except to the minimal set of ports and IP addresses required for their operation. Source: http://www.itworldcanada.com/article/how-the-internet-of-unpatchable-things-leads-to-ddos-attacks/387275

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How the ‘Internet of unpatchable things’ leads to DDoS attacks