Category Archives: Security Websies

Week in review: Grum botnet shutdown, Android malware, and Madi Trojan targeting the Middle East

Here's an overview of some of last week's most interesting news, articles and reviews: How to make smart grids To prepare for a successful roll-out of smart grids, a new ENISA study proposes 10 …

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Week in review: Grum botnet shutdown, Android malware, and Madi Trojan targeting the Middle East

How To Select A Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Mitigation Service

Late last month, two members of the hacker group LulzSec pleaded guilty to launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against entities ranging from the state of Arizona to Nintendo to the CIA. Yet despite extensive media coverage of such attacks, chief information security officers are still surprised when their companies get hit. This is not an unforeseeable lightning bolt from the blue, people. The cyber world is full of anonymous arsonists, and too many businesses are operating without a fire department on call. A few sprinklers won’t cut it when things flare out of control. Firewalls and intrusion-prevention system appliances are no substitute for specialized DDoS backup when an attack escalates. Proactively securing a mitigation service can be a good insurance policy–in fact, it’s better than insurance, which pays off only after damage is done. That’s because mitigation services are designed to prevent destruction from occurring in the first place. Not only can a mitigation service act as a deterrent–many attackers will move on to easier prey when they see an initial DDoS attack fail–but these providers have the capacity and expertise to rapidly scale DDoS countermeasures against coordinated, professional attacks. That can mean keeping your website online even under heavy bombardment. Big And Small Companies At Risk Denial-of-service attacks used to be something that happened to other people, those with high online visibility. Not anymore. “We’ve seen very small companies come to us and they can’t figure out why they’re under attack,” says Chris Richter, VP of security products and services at Savvis. They ask, “‘What have we done?’” Blame the proliferation of prepackaged DDoS toolkits, such as the Low Orbit Ion Cannon and Dirt Jumper, for the fact that no one’s safe. Like any brute-force tactic, DDoS relies on the fact that any attack, even the most rudimentary, repeated with sufficient volume and frequency, can effectively shut down a network or website. Botnets often span thousands or millions of systems worldwide; Akamai, for example, provides a real-time attack heat map. In early July, attack rates were almost 30% above normal, with hot spots in Delaware and Italy. Geographic dispersion, coupled with network traffic crafted to look like legitimate connections from normal users, makes DDoS attacks both extremely effective and difficult to defeat if you’re not an expert with the right tools. There are three main distributed denial-of-service categories: > > Volumetric attacks overwhelm WAN circuits with tens of gigabits per second of meaningless traffic–so-called ICMP or UDP floods. > > Layer 3 attacks abuse TCP. For example, SYN floods overload network equipment by starting but never completing thousands of TCP sessions using forged sender addresses. SYN floods can be in excess of 1 million packets per second, largely in response to the wider deployment of hardware countermeasures on firewalls and other security appliances, says Neal Quinn, COO of DDoS mitigation specialist Prolexic. > > Layer 7 floods use HTTP GET or POST requests to overload application and Web servers. From the attacker’s perspective, L7 exploits aren’t anonymous. The attacking client’s identity (IP address) is exposed because a TCP handshake must be completed. Attackers who use this approach consider the risk outweighed by the technique’s effectiveness at much lower volumes and the traffic’s stealthy nature. Requests are designed to look like normal Web traffic, factors that make L7 attacks hard to detect. Our InformationWeek 2012 Strategic Security Survey shows that the increasing sophistication of threats is the most-cited reason for worry among respondents who say their orgs are more vulnerable now than in 2011, and L7 attacks are certainly sophisticated. They’re also getting more common: Mark Teolis, founder and CEO of DOSarrest , a DDoS mitigation service, says 85% of the attacks his company sees have a Layer 7 component. Attackers leveraging L7 are often developers; they may do some reconnaissance on a website, looking for page requests that aren’t cacheable and are very CPU-intensive–things like filling a shopping cart, searching a database, or posting a complex form. Teolis says that a mere 2 to 3 Mbps increase in specially crafted L7 traffic can be crippling. “We’ve had gaming sites tell us they can handle 30,000 customers, but if 100 hit this one thing, it’ll bring down the entire site,” he says. Layer 7 attacks are tough to defeat not only because the incremental traffic is minimal, but because it mimics normal user behavior. Teolis has seen attacks where an individual bot may hit a site only once or twice an hour–but there are 20,000 bots involved. Conventional network security appliances just can’t handle that kind of scenario. And meanwhile, legitimate customers can’t reach your site. Why Us? The motivations for a DDoS attack are as varied as the perpetrators. For many, it’s just business, with targets strategically chosen by cyber criminals. Others are political–a prime example is LulzSec hitting the Arizona Department of Public Safety to protest the state’s strict immigration law, SB 1070. And for some, it’s just sport. Given this randomness, it’s impossible to predict the need for professional distributed denial-of-service mitigation. For example, Teolis says one of DOSarrest ‘s customers was the Dog Whisperer, that guru of man’s best friend. “If Cesar Millan can get attacked, anyone is fair game,” he says. Purchasing mitigation services requires the same kind of budgeting as any form of IT security: What you spend on controls should be proportional to the value of the data or website. So, while any organization with an online presence is at some risk, those with financial or reputational assets that could be seriously damaged by going dark should take DDoS mitigation most seriously. Everyone should take these preparatory steps. > > Do online reconnaissance: Follow what’s being said about your company online, particularly on public social networks, and look for chatter that might hint at extortion or hacktivism. Subscribe to security threat assessment reports covering the latest DDoS techniques and incidents. Prolexic is one source for threat advisories; US-CERT also has overviews, like this one on Anonymous. > > Heed threat mitigation recommendations: DDoS threat reports typically include details about the attack signature and recommended mitigation steps. For example, a recent Prolexic report on the High Orbit Ion Cannon identifies specific attack signatures, in this case HTTP requests, and content filter rules to block them. For L3/L4 attacks, incorporate these rules into your firewall; do likewise for L7 attacks if your firewall supports application-layer filtering. > > Have a communications strategy: Know what you’ll tell employees, customers, and the media should you be the victim of an attack. Don’t wait to make statements up on the fly. > > Have an emergency mitigation backup plan: Although most DDoS mitigation services operate on a monthly subscription basis, if you haven’t signed up and an attack overwhelms your defenses, at least know who you’re gonna call. Quinn and Teolis say their services can be operational and filtering DDoS traffic within minutes, though of course it will cost you. What To Look For In DDoS Mitigation At the risk of oversimplification, DDoS mitigation services are fundamentally remote network traffic filters. Once your system detects an attack affecting your network or servers, you redirect traffic to the service; the service filters out the junk and passes legitimate packets to their original destinations. In this sense, it’s like a cloud-based spam filter for websites. This traffic redirection, so-called on-ramping, is typically done via DNS. The mitigation provider creates a virtual IP address, the customer makes a DNS A record (hostname) change pointing to the remote VIPA, traffic flows through the mitigation provider’s filters, and the provider forwards only legitimate traffic on to the original site. Those facing attacks on multiple systems can divert entire subnets using Border Gateway Protocol advertisements, using Generic Routing Encapsulation tunneling to direct traffic to the mitigation provider. Advertising a new route to an entire address block protects an entire group of machines and, says Quinn, has the advantage of being asymmetrical, in that the mitigation service is used only for inbound traffic. The most important DDoS mitigation features are breadth of attack coverage, speed of service initiation (traffic on-ramping), and traffic capacity. Given the increasing popularity of application-layer attacks, any service should include both L3/4 and L7 mitigation technology. Services may segment features into proactive, before-the-attack monitoring and reactive, during-the-incident mitigation. Customers with monthly subscriptions should demand typical and maximum mitigation times–measured in minutes, not hours–backed up by a service-level agreement with teeth. Even those procuring emergency mitigation services should expect fairly rapid response. Most DDoS specialists staff operations centers 24/7. With DDoS mitigation, procrastination can be expensive. For those 70% of customers who first turn to DOSarrest in an emergency, the setup fee for the first month is around $3,500 to $4,000, depending on the complexity of the site. In contrast, an average monthly cost on a subscription basis is $700 per public-facing IP address. Filtered bandwidth is another way to differentiate between services. Some, like Prolexic, adopt an all-you-can-eat pricing model. For a flat fee per server, customers can use the service as often as they need with as much bandwidth as required. Others, like DOSarrest , keep the “use as often as you like” model but include only a certain amount of clean bandwidth (10 Mbps in its case) in the base subscription, charging extra for higher-bandwidth tiers. Teolis says 10 Mbps is sufficient for at least 90% of his company’s customers. A few services use a pricing model akin to an attorney’s retainer, with a low monthly subscription but hefty fees for each DDoS incident. Richter says Savvis is moving to this model, saying that customers want usage-based pricing that resembles other cloud services. Prolexic’s Quinn counters that this pricing structure leads to unpredictable bills. Bottom line, there’s a DDoS service to suit your tolerance for risk and budgetary volatility. Optional services available from some providers include postattack analysis and forensics (what happened, from where, and by whom) and access to a managed network reputation database that tracks active botnets and sites linked to fraudulent or criminal activity, a feature that facilitates automated blacklisting to help prevent attacks in the first place. Aside from looking at service features, evaluate each company’s technical expertise and track record. DDoS mitigation specialists, for whom this is a core business (or perhaps their only business) arguably have more experience and focus than Internet service providers or managed security providers for which DDoS mitigation is just a sideline. Not surprisingly, Quinn, whose company was among the first to offer DDoS mitigation as a service, suggests customers should make vendors show evidence that DDoS mitigation is something they do regularly, not as a rare occurrence. Make sure the service has highly qualified staff dedicated to the task. Ask whether the provider has experts available 24/7 and how long it will take to access someone with the technical ability and authority to work on your problem. Unfortunately there’s no rule of thumb for measuring the DDoS mitigation return on investment; it’s really a case-by-case calculation based on the financial value of the site being attacked. It relies on factors such as the cost in lost revenue or organizational reputation for every minute of downtime. Quinn cites a common analyst cost estimate, which Cisco also uses in its product marketing, of $30 million for a 24-hour outage at a large e-commerce site. There’s a cruel asymmetry to DDoS attacks: They can cost thousands to mitigate, inflict millions in damage, and yet attackers can launch them on the cheap. A small botnet can be rented for as little as $600 a month, meaning a serious, sustained attack against multiple targets can be pulled off for $5,000 or $10,000. With damages potentially two or three orders of magnitude higher than the DDoS mitigation costs, many organizations are finding mitigation a worthwhile investment. In fact, three-quarters of DOSarrest ‘s customers don’t wait for a DDoS attack to flip the switch, but permanently filter all of their traffic through the service. That makes sense, particularly if it’s a high-value or high-visibility site, if your traffic fits within the cap, or if you’re using an uncapped service like Prolexic. These services use the same sorts of colocation hosting centers where companies would typically house public-facing websites, and they do geographically distributed load balancing and traffic routing to multiple data centers. That makes the risk of downtime on the provider’s end minimal. And this approach could actually reduce WAN costs since it filters junk before it ever touches your systems. Recommendations If a mitigation service is too expensive, there are things IT can do to lower the exposure and limit the damage from DDoS attacks (discussed more in depth in our full report): 1. Fortify your edge network: Ensure that firewall and IDS systems have DoS features turned on, including things like dropping spoofed or malformed packets, setting SYN, ICMP, and UDP flood drop thresholds, limiting connections per server and client, and dynamically filtering and automatically blocking (at least for a short time) clients sending bad packets. 2. Develop a whitelist of known good external systems: These include business partner gateways, ISP links and cloud providers. This ensures that stringent edge filtering, whether done on your firewall or by a DDoS service, lets good traffic through. 3. Perform regular audits and reviews of your edge devices: Look for anomalies like bandwidth spikes. This works best if the data is centrally collected and analyzed across every device in your network. 4. Understand how to identify DDoS traffic: Research attack signatures and have someone on your network team who knows how to use a packet sniffer to discriminate between legitimate and DDoS traffic. 5. Prepare DNS: Lower the DNS TTL for public-facing Web servers, since these are most likely to be attacked. If you need to protect an entire server subnet, have a plan to readvertise BGP routes to a mitigation service. 6. Keep public Web servers off your enterprise ISP link: With Web servers being the most common DDoS target, Michael Davis, CEO of Savid Technologies and a regular InformationWeek contributor, recommends Web hosting with a vendor that doesn’t share your pipes. “Your website may be down, but at least the rest of your business is up,” says Davis. 7. Practice good server and application security hygiene: Layer 7 attacks exploit operating system and application security flaws, often using buffer overflows to inject attack code into SQL databases or Web servers, so keep systems patched. For DDoS protection please click here . Source: Darkreading

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How To Select A Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Mitigation Service

Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ blackmailers busted in cross-border swoop

Cyber hoodlums targeted gold and silver traders Chinese and Hong Kong cops are hailing another success in their cross-border cyber policing efforts with the scalp of a high profile DDoS blackmail gang which targeted gold, silver and securities traders in the former British colony. Six cyber hoodlums were arrested on the mainland in Hunan, Hubei, Shanghai and other locations at the end of June, according to a report in local Hong Kong rag The Standard. Some 16 Hong Kong-based firms including the Chinese Gold & Silver Exchange were targeted in the scheme designed to blackmail them to the tune of 460,000 yuan (£46,200). The gang apparently threatened to cripple their victims’ web operations with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks if they didn’t cough up. Four of the targeted firms transferred funds totalling 290,000 yuan (£29,150) into designated bank accounts in mainland China, the report said. A source also told The Standard that some of the victims may have been involved in some shady dealings themselves, which made them more reluctant to seek police help. Roy Ko, centre manager of the Hong Kong Computer Emergency Response Team (HKCERT) told The Reg that the arrests are an indication of improving cross-border cyber policing efforts. “Working with counterparts cross border is always a challenge because of different practices, languages, different time zones and so on. Usually, HK and the mainland maintain a good working relationship, just like the HKCERT and CNCERT,” he said. “Because we are in the same time zone, the response is usually quicker than working with the US, for example, where we have to wait until the next day to get a response.” Ko also warned that the attacks show this form of cyber threat is still a popular one for avaricious criminal gangs. “Firms have to assess whether they are a probable target of such an attack – ie whether they rely heavily on the internet to do business – and then prepare countermeasures,” he added. “Subscribing to an anti-DDoS service may be part of the protection strategy in addition to anti-malware, firewall, etc.” Hong Kong businesses have been warned before that they’re fair game to hackers from neighbouring China. Source: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/07/04/hong_kong_china_bust_ddos_gang_blackmail/

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Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ blackmailers busted in cross-border swoop

Banking Outage Prevention Tips

A series of fresh technology shutdowns this spring at banks around the world reveals the financial services industry still has a long way to go toward ensuring full up time for networks, as well as communicating with the public about why tech glitches have happened and what is being done about them. In May, Santander, Barclays and HSBC were all hit by digital banking outages. Some customers of Barclays and Santander were unable to access accounts online for a time near the end of the month, an outage blamed largely on end-of-the-month transaction volume. At HSBC, an IT hardware failure temporarily rendered ATMs unable to dispense cash or accept card payments in the U.K. Barclays and Santander both apologized for the outages though statements, while HSBC’s approach revealed both the power and peril of social media in such cases. HSBC’s PR office took to social media to communicate updates on the outage, and to also receive criticism about the outage (HSBC, Santander and Barclays did not return queries for comment). After an earlier outage in November, HSBC had set up a social monitoring team to be more proactive about communicating with the public about tech glitches, a move that seemed to have some positive impact, as not all of the Twitter and Facebook postings about the most recent outage were complaints. The basic task of making sure the rails are working, and smoothing things over with customers when systems invariably shut down, is an even more pressing matter considering the propensity for outrage to spread quickly among the public via new channels. “One thing that’s true about outages is we’re hearing more about them. The prevalence of social media use by irate customers and even employees makes these outages more publicized,” says Jacob Jegher, a senior analyst at Celent. Jegher says the use of social media for outage communication is tough – balancing the need to communicate with customers with internal tech propriety is easier said than done. “While it’s certainly not the institution’s job nor should it be their job to go into every technical detail, it’s helpful to provide some sort of consistent messaging with updates, so customers know that the bank is listening to them,” Jegher says. National Australia Bank, which suffered from a series of periodic online outages about a year ago that left millions of people unable to access paychecks, responded with new due diligence and communications programs. In an email response to BTN, National Australia Bank Chief Information Officer Adam Bennett said the bank has since reduced incident numbers by as much as 40 percent through a project that has aimed to improve testing. He said that if an incident does occur, the bank communicates via social media channels, with regular updates and individual responses to consumers where possible. The bank also issued an additional statement to BTN, saying “while the transaction and data demands on systems have grown exponentially in recent years led by online and mobile banking, the rate of incidents has steadily declined due to a culture of continuous improvement…The team tests and uses a range of business continuity plans. While we don’t disclose the specifics, whenever possible we will evoke these plans to allow the customer experience to continue uninterrupted.” While communicating information about outages is good, it’s obviously better to prevent them in the first place. Coastal Bank & Trust, a $66 million-asset community bank based in Wilmington, N.C., has outsourced its monitoring and recovery, using disaster recovery support from Safe Systems, a business continuity firm, to vet for outage threats, supply backup server support in the event of an outage, and contribute to the bank’s preparation and response to mandatory yearly penetration and vulnerability tests. “Safe Systems makes sure that the IP addresses are accessible and helps with those scans,” says Renee Rhodes, chief compliance and operations officer for Coastal Bank & Trust. The bank has also outsourced security monitoring to Gladiator, a Jack Henry enterprise security monitoring product that scours the bank’s IT network to flag activity that could indicate a potential outage or external attack. The security updates include weekly virus scans and patches. Coastal Bank & Trust’s size – it has only 13 employees – makes digital banking a must for competitive reasons, which increases both the threat of downtime and the burden of maintaining access. “We do mobile, remote deposit capture, all of the products that the largest banks have. I am a network administrator, and one of my co-workers is a security officer. With that being said, none of us has an IT background,” Rhodes says. “I don’t know if I could put a number on how important it is to have these systems up and running.” Much of the effort toward managing downtime risk is identifying and thwarting external threats that could render systems inoperable for a period of time. Troy Bradley, chief technology officer at FIS, says the tech firm has noticed an increase in external denial of service attacks recently, which is putting the entire banking and financial services technology industries on alert for outage and tech issues with online banking and other platforms. “You’ll see a lot of service providers spending time on this. It’s not the only continuity requirement to solve, but it’s one of the larger ones,” he says. To mitigate downtime risk for its hosted solutions, FIS uses virtualization to backstop the servers that run financial applications, such as web banking or mobile banking. That creates a “copy” of that server for redundancy purposes, and that copy can be moved to another data center if necessary. “We can host the URL (that runs the web enabled service on behalf of the bank) at any data center…if we need to move the service or host it across multiple data centers we can do that…we think we have enough bandwidth across these data centers to [deal with] any kind of denial of service attack that a crook can come up with,” Bradley says. FIS also uses third party software to monitor activity at its data centers in Brown Deer, WI; Little Rock and Phoenix, searching for patterns that can anticipate a denial of service attack early and allow traffic connected to its clients to be routed to one of the other two data centers. For licensed solutions, FIS sells added middleware that performs a similar function, creating a redundant copy of a financial service that can be stored and accessed in the case of an emergency. Stephanie Balaouras, a vice president and research director for security and risk at Forrester Research, says virtualization is a good way to mitigate both performance issues, such as systems being overwhelmed by the volume of customer transactions, and operational issues such as hardware failure, software failure, or human error. “If it’s [performance], the bank needs to revisit its bandwidth and performance capacity. With technologies like server virtualization, it shouldn’t be all that difficult for a large bank to bring additional capacity online in advance of peak periods or specific sales and marketing campaigns that would increase traffic to the site. The same technology would also allow the bank to load-balance performance across all of its servers – non-disruptively. The technology is never really the main challenge, it tends to be the level of maturity and sophistication of the IT processes for capacity planning, performance management, incident management, automation, etc.,” she says. In the case of operational issues, server virtualization is still a great technology, Balaouras says, adding it allows the bank to restart failed workloads within minutes to alternate physical servers in the environment or even to another other data center. “You can also configure virtual servers in high-availability or fault-tolerant pairs across physical servers so that one hardware failure cannot take down a mission-critical application or service,” Balaouras says. Balaouras says more significant operational failures, such as a storage area network (SAN) failure, pose a greater challenge to network continuity and back up efforts. “In this case, you would need to recover from a backup. But more than likely a bank should treat this as ‘disaster’ and failover operations to another data center where there is redundant IT infrastructure,” she says. Source: http://www.americanbanker.com/btn/25_7/online-banking-outage-prevention-strategies-1050405-1.html

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Banking Outage Prevention Tips

LulzSec Members Confess To Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Attacks to SOCA, Sony and etc

Four alleged members of the LulzSec hacktivist group had their day in British court Monday. Two of the people charged–Ryan Cleary, 20, and Jake Leslie Davis, 19–appeared at Southwark Crown Court in England to enter guilty pleas against some of the charges against them, including hacking the public-facing websites of the CIA and Britain’s Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA). All told, Cleary, who’s from England, pleaded guilty to six of the eight charges lodged against him, including unauthorized access to Pentagon computers controlled by the U.S. Air Force. Meanwhile, Davis–who hails from Scotland’s Shetland Islands–pleaded guilty to two of the four charges made against him. The pair pleaded not guilty to two charges of violating the U.K.’s Serious Crime Act by having posted “unlawfully obtained confidential computer data” to numerous public websites–including LulzSec.com, PasteBin, and the Pirate Bay–to encourage or assist in further offenses, including “supplying articles for use in fraud.” They did, however, confess to launching numerous botnet-driven distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks under the banners of Anonymous, Internet Feds, and LulzSec. According to authorities, the pair targeted websites owned by the Arizona State Police, the Fox Broadcasting Company, News International, Nintendo, and Sony Pictures Entertainment. The pair have also been charged with targeting, amongst other organizations, HBGary, HBGary Federal, the Atlanta chapter of Infragard, Britain’s National Health Service, the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), and Westboro Baptist church. [ Learn about another hacker indictment. See Feds Bust Hacker For Selling Government Supercomputer Access. ] The two other alleged LulzSec members charged Monday are England-based Ryan Mark Ackroyd, 25, as well as a 17-year-old London student who hasn’t been named by authorities since he’s a minor. Both also appeared at Southwark Crown Court and pleaded not guilty to four charges made against them, including participating in DDoS attacks, as well as “encouraging or assisting an offense.” All four of the LulzSec accused are due to stand trial on the charges leveled against them–for offenses that allegedly took place between February and September 2011–on April 8, 2013. According to news reports, the court heard Monday that reviewing all of the evidence just for the charges facing Cleary will require 3,000 hours. Three of the accused have been released on bail. Cleary was not released; he had been released on conditional bail in June 2011, but violated his bail conditions by attempting to contact the LulzSec leader known as Sabu at Christmastime. LulzSec–at least in its original incarnation–was a small, focused spinoff from Anonymous, which itself sprang from the free-wheeling 4chan image boards. LulzSec was short for Lulz Security, with “lulz” (the plural of LOL or laugh out loud) generally referring to laughs gained at others’ expense. According to U.S. authorities, Davis often operated online using the handles topiary and atopiary, while Ackroyd was known online as lol, lolspoon, as well as a female hacker and botnet aficionado dubbed Kayla. What might be read into Ackroyd allegedly posing as a female hacker? According to Parmy Olson’s recently released book, We Are Anonymous, such behavior isn’t unusual in hacking forums, given the scarcity of actual women involved. “Females were a rare sight on image boards and hacking forums; hence the online catchphrase ‘There are no girls on the Internet,’ and why posing as a girl has been a popular tactic for Internet trolls for years,” wrote Olson. “But this didn’t spell an upper hand for genuine females. If they revealed their sex on an image board … they were often met with misogynistic comments.” In related LulzSec prosecution news, Cleary last week was also indicted by a Los Angeles federal grand jury on charges that overlap with some of the ones filed by British prosecutors. At least so far, however, U.S. prosecutors have signaled that they won’t be seeking Cleary’s extradition, leaving him to face charges in the United Kingdom. The shuttering of LulzSec both in the United States and Great Britain was facilitated by the efforts of SOCA, as well as the FBI, which first arrested Anonymous and LulzSec leader Sabu–real name, Hector Xavier Monsegur–in June 2011, then turned him into a confidential government informant before arresting him again, earlier this year, on a 12-count indictment. As revealed in a leaked conference call earlier this year, British and American authorities were working closely together to time their busts of alleged LulzSec and Anonymous operators on both sides of the Atlantic, apparently using evidence gathered by Monsegur. Source: informationweek

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LulzSec Members Confess To Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDoS’ Attacks to SOCA, Sony and etc

Legalization of Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDDoS’ attacks as a form of protest

Dutch opposition party D66 has proposed the legalization of DDoS attacks as a form of protest. Activists would have to warn of their action in advance, giving websites time to prepare for their attack. ­Kees Verhoeven, the campaign’s leader, argues that it is strange that the fundamental right to demonstrate doesn’t extend to the online realm. The coming years would bring more instances of hacktivism, and it would be reasonable to introduce legislation to regulate, not ban it, he says. Verhoeven proposes that DDoS attacks be legalized so long as the protesters say when they will start their action. That way, a website would have time to prepare for the attack, just like an office building has time to get ready for a rally next to it. The proposal also includes restrictions on transmitting information about a website’s visitors, as well as stricter rules against e-mail spying, and other measures to bolster online privacy. DDoS attacks, popular with hacktivist groups such as Anonymous, would therefore become a legal means to express dissatisfaction with a company or a government. One DDoS attack per year would cost over $10,000 for a financial services company that makes 25 per cent of its sales online, according to Internet traffic management firm NeuStar UltraDNS. If the brand reputation of the company heavily depends on the performance of the website, one DDoS attack a year could end up costing over $20,500. However, DDoS attacks are relatively innocuous compared to other forms of hacking, such as phishing and virus infections, which can cost companies and individuals millions of dollars. Nevertheless, DDoS attacks are so far equated to hacking and are illegal in the Netherlands, as well as many other countries. Source: http://www.rt.com/news/dutch-party-d66-ddos-legalized-protest-541/

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Legalization of Distributed Denial of Service ‘DDDoS’ attacks as a form of protest

RBS & NatWest Web services knocked out; Oslo Bors hit by DDoS attack

Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and its NatWest and Ulster Bank subsidiaries have been hit by “technical issues” that have left customers unable to access online services. In a statement, RBS says: “We are currently experiencing technical issues which mean that a number of customer account balances have not yet been updated and some of our online services are temporarily unavailable.” A similar message appears on the NatWest Web site, with the bank adding: “We are working hard to fix this issue as soon as possible and will keep you updated on progress. We are experiencing very high call volumes as a result.” In a later update, RBS has revealed that the issue “was caused by a failure of our systems to properly update customers’ balances overnight. The main problem customers are having is that where people have had money go into their accounts overnight, there may be a delay in it showing up on their balance.” The problems have been ongoing for several hours, with NatWest first acknowledging the issue on its Twitter feed at 08.43, eliciting responses from customers complaining that payments have not been processed and wages not paid. The ongoing crisis has forced the bank to take drastic measures, promising to keep over 1000 branches open until 19:00BST on Thursday to assist short-changed customers. Daoud Fakhri, a senior analyst at Datamonitor says the episode is emblematic of wider problems facing the banking sector as a whole. “Many providers, being early adopters of IT systems when the technology was still in its infancy, have been left saddled with inflexible core systems that are often several decades old, and that are increasingly unable to cope with the demands being placed on them,” he says. “The growing expectations of consumers around online and mobile banking means that the tensions between the provision of ever more sophisticated services and the capability of core systems to satisfy these demands are close to breaking point, and this increases the likelihood of episodes such as the NatWest mishap happening again. Separately, the Web site of Norwegian bourse Oslo Børs has been knocked off line, apparently by a DDoS attack . Spokesman Per Eikrem told local outlet NTB that the hit is only affecting the exchange’s site and not its trading, messaging or monitoring systems. Source: http://www.finextra.com/News/Fullstory.aspx?newsitemid=23830

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RBS & NatWest Web services knocked out; Oslo Bors hit by DDoS attack

Check Point releases new DDoS Protector appliances

Check Point introduced a new line of security appliances designed to fight DDoS attacks. The DDoS Protector appliances deliver multi-layered protection and up to 12 Gbps of throughput to help business…

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Accused British hacker launch DDoS attack and charged in U.S. over LulzSec attacks

A federal grand jury in Los Angeles has indicted a 20-year-old British citizen on charges related to attacks by the LulzSec hacking group on the Fox and PBS television networks and Sony’s film and TV studio, authorities said on Wednesday. Ryan Cleary, who is already jailed in the United Kingdom where he faces prosecution over similar charges, is accused of joining other members of LulzSec in harnessing compromised computers, known as a “botnet,” to steal confidential information, deface websites or attack servers. He was indicted on Tuesday. “Cleary is a skilled hacker. He controlled his own botnet, employed sophisticated methods and his broad geographic scope affected a large number of businesses and individuals,” FBI spokeswoman Laura Eimiller said. LulzSec, an offshoot of the international hacking group Anonymous, has taken credit for hacking attacks on government and private sector websites. Anonymous and its offshoots, including LulzSec and AntiSec, initially focused on fighting attempts at Internet regulation and the blocking of free illegal downloads, but have since taken on such targets as Scientology and the global banking system. The charges come just over two months after accused LulzSec hacker Cody Kretsinger pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles to taking part in an extensive computer breach of Sony Corp’s Sony Pictures Entertainment. In March, court documents revealed that Anonymous leader “Sabu,” whose real name is Hector Xavier Monsegur, had pleaded guilty to hacking-related charges and provided the FBI with information on fellow hackers. According to the indictment released by the FBI, Cleary and his unnamed co-conspirators hacked into the computer systems of News Corp’s Fox Entertainment Group and Sony Pictures Entertainment and stole confidential user information. The indictment also charges Cleary and his co-conspirators of defacing the PBS website and launching “denial of service” attacks against an online gaming website and Britain’s Serious Organized Crime Agency. Cleary is charged with one count of conspiracy and two counts of unauthorized impairment of a protected computer. He faces a maximum sentence of 25 years in prison if convicted. Eimiller said federal authorities would “allow the prosecution to take its course” against Cleary overseas before deciding whether to seek his extradition to the United States. He is next scheduled to be in court in the U.K. on June 25. Anonymous, and LulzSec in particular, became notorious in late 2010 when they launched what they called the “first cyber war” in retaliation for attempts to shut down the WikiLeaks website. They attacked websites including those of MasterCard Inc, which had tried to block payments to WikiLeaks after apparent pressure from the U.S. government following the release of thousands of diplomatic cables. Source: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/net-us-usa-lulzsec-hacking-idUSBRE85D00620120614

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Accused British hacker launch DDoS attack and charged in U.S. over LulzSec attacks