Category Archives: Security Websies

Chinese cyber-spies hid botnet controls in MS TechNet comments

Online spooks hide ‘numbers station’ control node in plain sight Cyber-spies are increasingly attempting to hide their command and control operations in plain sight by burying their command infrastructure in the forums of internet heavyweights, including Microsoft.…

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Chinese cyber-spies hid botnet controls in MS TechNet comments

SAP crypto offers customers choice of remote code execution or denial of service

Home-baked encryption followed the wrong recipe Yet another proprietary implementation of a popular protocol has turned up unexpected vulnerabilities, with SAP’s data compression software open to remote code execution and denial-of-service exploits.…

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SAP crypto offers customers choice of remote code execution or denial of service

How organisations can eliminate the DDoS attack ‘blind spot’

Most DDoS defence solutions are missing critical parts of the threat landscape thanks to a lack of proper visibility. Online organisations need to take a closer look at the problem of business disruption resulting from the external DDoS attacks that every organisation is unavoidably exposed to when they connect to an unsecured or ‘raw’ Internet feed. Key components of any realistic DDoS defense strategy are proper visualisation and analytics into these security events. DDoS event data allows security teams to see all threat vectors associated with an attack – even complex hybrid attacks that are well disguised in order to achieve the goal of data exfiltration. Unfortunately, many legacy DDoS defense solutions are not focused on providing visibility into all layers of an attack and are strictly tasked with looking for flow peaks on the network. If all you are looking for is anomalous bandwidth spikes, you may be missing critical attack vectors that are seriously compromising your business. In the face of this new cyber-risk, traditional approaches to network security are proving ineffective. The increase in available Internet bandwidth, widespread access to cyber-attack software tools and ‘dark web’ services for hire, has led to a rapid evolution of increasingly sophisticated DDoS techniques used by cyber criminals to disrupt and exploit businesses around the world. DDoS as a diversionary tactic Today, DDoS attack techniques are more commonly employed by attackers to do far more than deny service. Attack attempts experienced by Corero’s protected customers in Q4 2014 indicate that short bursts of sub-saturating DDoS attacks are becoming more of the norm. The recent DDoS Trends and Analysis report indicates that 66% of attack attempts targeting Corero customers were less than 1Gbps in peak bandwidth utilisation, and were under five minutes in duration. Clearly this level of attack is not a threat to disrupt service for the majority of online entities. And yet the majority of attacks utilising well known DDoS attack vectors fit this profile. So why would a DDoS attack be designed to maintain service availability if ‘Denial of Service’ is the true intent? What’s the point if you aren’t aiming to take an entire IT infrastructure down, or wipe out hosted customers with bogus traffic, or flood service provider environments with massive amounts of malicious traffic? Unfortunately, the answer is quite alarming. For organisations that don’t take advantage of in-line DDoS protection positioned at the network edge, these partial link saturation attacks that occur in bursts of short duration, enter the network unimpeded and begin overwhelming traditional security infrastructure. In turn, this activity stimulates un-necessary logging of DDoS event data, which may prevent the logging of more important security events and sends the layers of the security infrastructure into a reboot or fall back mode. These attacks are sophisticated enough to leave just enough bandwidth available for other multi-vector attacks to make their way into the network and past weakened network security layers undetected. There would be little to no trace of these additional attack vectors infiltrating the compromised network, as the initial DDoS had done its job—distract all security resources from performing their intended functions. Multi-vector and adaptive DDoS attack techniques are becoming more common Many equate DDoS with one type of attack vector – volumetric. It is not surprising, as these high bandwidth-consuming attacks are easier to identify, and defend against with on-premises or cloud based anti-DDoS solutions, or a combination of both. The attack attempts against Corero’s customers in Q4 2014 not only employed brute force multi-vector DDoS attacks, but there was an emerging trend where attackers have implemented more adaptive multi-vector methods to profile the nature of the target network’s security defenses, and subsequently selected a second or third attack designed to circumvent an organisation’s layered protection strategy. While volumetric attacks remain the most common DDoS attack type targeting Corero customers, combination or adaptive attacks are emerging as a new threat vector. Empowering security teams with DDoS visibility As the DDoS threat landscape evolves, so does the role of the security team tasked with protecting against these sophisticated and adaptive attacks. Obtaining clear visibility into the attacks lurking on the network is rapidly becoming a priority for network security professionals. The Internet connected business is now realising the importance of security tools that offer comprehensive visibility from a single analysis console or ‘single pane of glass’ to gain a complete understanding of the DDoS attacks and cyber threats targeting their Internet-facing services. Dashboards of actionable security intelligence can expose volumetric DDoS attack activity, such as reflection, amplification, and flooding attacks. Additionally, insight into targeted resource exhaustion attacks, low and slow attacks, victim servers, ports, and services as well as malicious IP addresses and botnets is mandatory. Unfortunately, most attacks of these types typically slide under the radar in DDoS scrubbing lane solutions, or go completely undetected by cloud based DDoS protection services, which rely on coarse sampling of the network perimeter. Extracting meaningful information from volumes of raw security events has been a virtual impossibility for all but the largest enterprises with dedicated security analysts. Next generation DDoS defense solutions can provide this capability in a turn-key fashion to organisations of all sizes. By combining high-performance in-line DDoS event detection and mitigation capabilities with sophisticated event data analysis in a state-of-the-art big data platform, these solutions can quickly find the needles in the haystack of security events. With the ability to uncover hidden patterns of data, identify emerging vulnerabilities within the massive streams of DDoS attack and security event data, and respond decisively with countermeasures, next-generation DDoS first line of defense solutions provide security teams with the tools required to better protect their organization against the dynamic DDoS threat landscape. Source: http://www.information-age.com/technology/security/123459482/how-organisations-can-eliminate-ddos-attack-blind-spot  

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How organisations can eliminate the DDoS attack ‘blind spot’

Anonymous Knocks Pro-Nazi Websites Offline with DDoS Attacks

Anonymous hackers decided to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi forces in 1945, by Anonymous Sweden deciding to knock pro-Nazi websites offline in motion of the 70 year old victory. Hacktivists in Sweden took it upon themselves to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi forces in Germany by knocking offline pro-Nazi affiliated domains hosted exclusively by Swedish companies. Targets were limited but extremely well known with well-over hundreds of thousands of monthly visitors. Specific targets included nordfront[dot]se and svenskarnasparti[dot]se, which were both taken offline by a large Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack and have been inaccessible for several days. The domains remain offline during the time of writing this article and were initially taken offline mid afternoon Friday. Depending on the size of the attack, the domains could remain offline and inaccessible for several days as they have been already. Anonymous Sweden announced their news on Pastebin, with a letter to pro-Nazi websites that were apart of their targeted attack, stating: Today it’s 70 years since nazi-Germany fell. But nazis is still marching in Europe.. Attacking peaceful protesters and spreading fear across the world. It is our duty to remember what happend and never let the horrors be forgotten.. It is our duty to fight nazism. Today we Will wipe the nazis of the webs! Main targets Www.nordfront.se Server info : Apache/2.2.22 (Debian) mod_fcgid/2.3.6 mod_ssl/2.2.22 OpenSSL/1.0.1e IP: 176.10.250.104 is their dotted decimal Www.svenskarnasparti.se Server info: its a worldpress site with cloudfare “Protection” We are Anonymous We do not forgive We do not forget Hitler-fan boys, its time to expect us! /Anonymous Sweden with friends! Special thanks to PH1K3 United as one divided by zero Anonymous started their attacks May 8th, and the domains are still offline nearly 48 hours later. The Swedish collective did not note any specific groups for taking part other than releasing the news via pastebin. We will keep you updated. Source: http://freedomhacker.net/anonymous-knocks-pro-nazi-websites-offline-ddos-attack-4106/

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Anonymous Knocks Pro-Nazi Websites Offline with DDoS Attacks

Enterprises must be proactive in DDoS mitigation

DDoS attacks are more prevalent than ever and enterprises can’t always rely on their service providers for protection. Learn what enterprises should do for effective DDoS mitigation. Moving unified communications applications to the cloud can simplify business operations. But cloud infrastructure can present vulnerabilities that attract malicious attacks like distributed denial of service (DDoS). And with many enterprises using service providers for their UC applications, DDoS attacks can be more damaging than ever. As the threat of DDoS attacks loom, there is a disconnect between enterprises and their service providers taking responsibility during an attack, according to a report from DDoS mitigation service provider Black Lotus Communications, which surveyed 129 service providers and the impact of DDoS on their business. According to the report, many organizations believe they can rely on their service provider to manage a DDoS attack and its impact on their business. But the reality is most providers believe they are solely responsible for making sure their infrastructure remains intact during an attack and that the direct impact of an attack is the customer’s responsibility. “Service providers with undeveloped DDoS mitigation strategies may choose to sacrifice a customer by black hole routing their traffic or recommending a different service provider in order to protect the service of other customers,” said Chris Rodriguez, network security senior analyst at Frost & Sullivan. Enterprises can lose anywhere from $100,000 to tens of millions of dollars per hour in an attack, the report found. Just over one-third of service providers reported being hit with one or more DDoS attacks weekly, according to the report. Managed hosting services, VoIP and platform as a service were the three industries most affected by DDoS. During an attack, 52% of service providers reported temporarily blocking the targeted customer, 34% reported removing the targeted customer, 32% referred customers to a partner DDoS mitigation provider and 26% encouraged an attacked customer to find a new service provider. But by removing or blocking a customer, service providers have effectively helped the attackers achieve their goal and leave enterprises suffering the consequences, according to the report. Communicating DDoS concerns Three-quarters of service providers reported feeling very to extremely confident they could withstand a catastrophic DDoS attack, and 92% of providers have protections in place. But the report found that the majority of providers use traditional protections that have become less effective in mitigating DDoS. To maximize DDoS protection, Nemertes Research CEO Johna Till Johnson offered four questions that enterprises should ask when evaluating service provider security and DDoS protection. What protections does the service provider have in place in the event of an attack? Don’t be afraid to ask service providers questions regarding the DDoS mitigation products and services they use, what their DDoS track record is or how many clients have been victims of an attack. “If they refuse to answer, it tells you something about the vendor,” Johnson said. “Any legitimate provider has this information and will share it with customers.” Is the service provider willing to put DDoS mitigation in a service-level agreement ( SLA )? The provider may already include DDoS protection or may require the enterprise to buy a service. But if a provider won’t include DDoS mitigation in an SLA, find out why. “If you’re not going to put it in black and white, you’re at risk,” she said. What third-party services does the provider recommend? Service providers may have third-party partnerships that can deliver DDoS protection. What is your organization’s stance on security? Johnson recommends having a line item in the budget for DDoS that covers a DDoS mitigation service or product. Making DDoS mitigation plans If a service provider is hit with a DDoS attack, there are two issues facing enterprises, Johnson said. The first issue is if the enterprise experienced a small hit in the attack. “If you’ve gotten a gentle probe, then attackers may be coming after you,” she said. Just like when a credit card number is stolen and the thief spends a small amount of money to test the number before making the large, fraudulent charges, attackers are testing for vulnerabilities. Enterprises should immediately figure out where they’re at risk and what they can do to protect themselves now, Johnson said. The second issue, she said, is that DDoS isn’t just an attack, it’s an earthquake. A disaster recovery plan is required so enterprises know what to do if a core application is suddenly unavailable. “DDoS attack techniques continue to change, and enterprises must be proactive in their defenses,” Rodriguez said. He said a hybrid approach to DDoS mitigation has emerged as an effective strategy. Hybrid DDoS mitigation requires an on-premises DDoS mitigation appliance to protect an enterprise’s infrastructure and a cloud-based DDoS mitigation service that routes traffic to a scrubbing center and returns clean traffic. The on-premises appliance is used during smaller attacks; and when attacks reach a certain size, the appliance can signal for the cloud-based service to take over. “This allows the organization to use the DDoS services sparingly and only when necessary, with a seamless transition between the two services,” he said. Source: http://searchunifiedcommunications.techtarget.com/news/4500245890/Enterprises-must-be-proactive-in-DDoS-mitigation

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Enterprises must be proactive in DDoS mitigation

Dukascopy Server Crash on Wednesday Caused by DDoS Attack

The company has contracted a third party specializing in such threats in order to prevent further attacks from happening S wiss Dukascopy Bank was a target of a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack yesterday, a company spokesperson shared with Finance Magnates’ reporters. The server crash prompted a number of the brokerage’s clients to take to social media in order to establish what the issues were with the website and the demo and real accounts servers of the firm. Additionally, the company detailed that the outage lasted an hour and thirteen minutes. A company spokesperson stated to Finance Magnates reporters, “As you may know yesterday starting from 12:31 GMT to 13:44 GMT Dukascopy servers were down due to a DD0S attack.” The DDoS attack was successfully mitigated and we expect that it will not be repeated “The DDoS attack was successfully mitigated and we expect that it will not be repeated. Protection measures have been implemented, including enabling third party services specializing on such kind of threats.” As stated above, the company has turned to a third party contractor in order to alleviate the risks associated with any further DDoS attack. Financial services institutions are frequent targets of DDoS attacks, however the companies most frequently suffering are banks or credit card payment gateways. In the earlier stages of online business, threats about DDoS attacks have been unlawfully used by some outfits to blackmail their competitors. Our reporters have heard about similar criminal practices remaining in play in more recent cases in the industry. Both binary options providers and brokers have been targets of similar attacks in recent years. As for Dukascopy, it is business as usual on the company’s platforms today, while the euro is hitting fresh 1-month highs against the U.S. dollar and the British pound. Source: http://www.financemagnates.com/forex/brokers/dukascopy-server-crash-on-wednesday-caused-by-ddos-attack/

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Dukascopy Server Crash on Wednesday Caused by DDoS Attack

FBI investigating Rutgers University in DDoS attack

The FBI is working with Rutgers University to identify the source of a series of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that have plagued the school this week. The assault began Monday morning and took down internet service across the campus according to NJ.com. Some professors had to cancel classes and students were unable to enroll, submit assignments or take finals since Wi-fi service and email have been affected as has an online resource called Sakai. This is the second DDoS attack on the university this month and the third since November. Authorities and the Rutgers Office of Information and Technology (OIT) haven’t released any details thus far about the possible source of the attacks. Currently, only certain parts of the university have internet service. The school will make frequent updates on to the Rutgers website about its progress in restoring service. Source: http://www.scmagazine.com/the-fbi-is-helpign-rutger-inveigate-a-series-of-ddos-attack/article/412149/

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FBI investigating Rutgers University in DDoS attack

One fifth of DDoS attacks last over a day

Some 20 per cent of DDoS attacks have lasting damage that can see them taking a site down for 24 hours or more, according to research by Kaspersky. In fact, almost a tenth of the companies surveyed said their systems were down for several weeks or longer, while less than a third said they had disruption lasting less than an hour. The investigation revealed that the majority of attacks (65 per cent) caused severe delays or complete disruption, while only a third caused no disruption at all. Evgeny Vigovsky, head of Kaspersky DDoS Protection, said: “For companies, losing a service completely for a short time, or suffering constant delays in accessing it over several days, can be equally serious problems. “Both situations can impact customer satisfaction and their willingness to use the same service in the future. Using reliable security solutions to protect against DDoS attacks enables companies to give their customers uninterrupted access to online services, regardless of whether they are facing a powerful short-term assault or a weaker but persistent long-running campaign.” The company highlighted an attack on Github at the end of March when Chinese hackers brought the site down. That attack lasted 118 hours and demonstrated that even large communities are at risk. Last month, another study by Kaspersky revealed that only 37 per cent of companies were prepared for a DDoS attack, despite 26 per cent of them being concerned the problems caused by such attacks were long-term, meaning they could lose current or prospective clients as a result. Source: http://www.itpro.co.uk/security/24514/one-fifth-of-ddos-attacks-last-over-a-day

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One fifth of DDoS attacks last over a day

How Google saw the DDoS attack against Github and GreatFire

The recent DDoS attacks aimed at GreatFire, a website that exposes China's internet censorship efforts and helps users get access to their mirror-sites, and GitHub, the world's largest code hosting se…

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How Google saw the DDoS attack against Github and GreatFire

A Javascript-based DDoS Attack as seen by Safe Browsing

To protect users from malicious content, Safe Browsing’s infrastructure analyzes web pages with web browsers running in virtual machines. This allows us to determine if a page contains malicious content, such as Javascript meant to exploit user machines. While machine learning algorithms select which web pages to inspect, we analyze millions of web pages every day and achieve good coverage of the web in general. In the middle of March, several sources reported a large Distributed Denial-of-Service attack against the censorship monitoring organization GreatFire. Researchers have extensively analyzed this DoS attack and found it novel because it was conducted by a network operator that intercepted benign web content to inject malicious Javascript. In this particular case, Javascript and HTML resources hosted on baidu.com were replaced with Javascript that would repeatedly request resources from the attacked domains. While Safe Browsing does not observe traffic at the network level, it affords good visibility at the HTTP protocol level. As such our infrastructure picked up this attack, too. Using Safe Browsing data, we can provide a more complete timeline of the attack and shed light on what injections occurred when. For this blog post, we analyzed data from March 1st to April 15th 2015. Safe Browsing first noticed injected content against baidu.com domains on March 3rd, 2015. The last time we observed injections during our measurement period was on April 7th, 2015. This is visible in the graph below, which plots the number of injections over time as a percentage of all injections observed: We noticed that the attack was carried out in multiple phases. The first phase appeared to be a testing stage and was conducted from March 3rd to March 6th. The initial test target was 114.113.156.119:56789 and the number of requests was artificially limited. From March 4rd to March 6th, the request limitations were removed. The next phase was conducted between March 10th and 13th and targeted the following IP address at first: 203.90.242.126. Passive DNS places hosts under the sinajs.cn domain at this IP address. On March 13th, the attack was extended to include d1gztyvw1gvkdq.cloudfront.net. At first, requests were made over HTTP and then upgraded to to use HTTPS. On March 14th, the attack started for real and targeted d3rkfw22xppori.cloudfront.net both via HTTP as well as HTTPS. Attacks against this specific host were carried out until March 17th. On March 18th, the number of hosts under attack was increased to include the following: d117ucqx7my6vj.cloudfront.net, d14qqseh1jha6e.cloudfront.net, d18yee9du95yb4.cloudfront.net, d19r410x06nzy6.cloudfront.net, d1blw6ybvy6vm2.cloudfront.net. This is also the first time we find truncated injections in which the Javascript is cut-off and non functional. At some point during this phase of the attack, the cloudfront hosts started serving 302 redirects to greatfire.org as well as other domains. Substitution of Javascript ceased completely on March 20th but injections into HTML pages continued. Whereas Javascript replacement breaks the functionality of the original content, injection into HTML does not. Here HTML is modified to include both a reference to the original content as well as the attack Javascript as shown below: [… regular attack Javascript …] In this technique, the web browser fetches the same HTML page twice but due to the presence of the query parameter t, no injection happens on the second request. The attacked domains also changed and now consisted of: dyzem5oho3umy.cloudfront.net, d25wg9b8djob8m.cloudfront.net and d28d0hakfq6b4n.cloudfront.net. About 10 hours after this new phase started, we see 302 redirects to a different domain served from the targeted servers. The attack against the cloudfront hosts stops on March 25th. Instead, resources hosted on github.com were now under attack. The first new target was github.com/greatfire/wiki/wiki/nyt/ and was quickly followed by github.com/greatfire/ as well as github.com/greatfire/wiki/wiki/dw/. On March 26th, a packed and obfuscated attack Javascript replaced the plain version and started targeting the following resources: github.com/greatfire/ and github.com/cn-nytimes/. Here we also observed some truncated injections. The attack against github seems to have stopped on April 7th, 2015 and marks the last time we saw injections during our measurement period. From the beginning of March until the attacks stopped in April, we saw 19 unique Javascript replacement payloads as represented by their MD5 sum in the pie chart below. For the HTML injections, the payloads were unique due to the injected URL so we are not showing their respective MD5 sums. However, the injected Javascript was very similar to the payloads referenced above. Our systems saw injected content on the following eight baidu.com domains and corresponding IP addresses: cbjs.baidu.com (123.125.65.120) eclick.baidu.com (123.125.115.164) hm.baidu.com (61.135.185.140) pos.baidu.com (115.239.210.141) cpro.baidu.com (115.239.211.17) bdimg.share.baidu.com (211.90.25.48) pan.baidu.com (180.149.132.99) wapbaike.baidu.com (123.125.114.15) The sizes of the injected Javascript payloads ranged from 995 to 1325 bytes. We hope this report helps to round out the overall facts known about this attack. It also demonstrates that collectively there is a lot of visibility into what happens on the web. At the HTTP level seen by Safe Browsing, we cannot confidently attribute this attack to anyone. However, it makes it clear that hiding such attacks from detailed analysis after the fact is difficult. Had the entire web already moved to encrypted traffic via TLS, such an injection attack would not have been possible. This provides further motivation for transitioning the web to encrypted and integrity-protected communication. Unfortunately, defending against such an attack is not easy for website operators. In this case, the attack Javascript requests web resources sequentially and slowing down responses might have helped with reducing the overall attack traffic. Another hope is that the external visibility of this attack will serve as a deterrent in the future. Source: http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.ca/2015/04/a-javascript-based-ddos-attack-as-seen.html

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A Javascript-based DDoS Attack as seen by Safe Browsing